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ESTATE INVESTMENTS
By HUGH MCLEAN, of the Denver Bar

T

HIS rather expansive title needs definition and restric-

tion. It is perhaps needless to say that no attempt is
here made to give inside information (not possessed by
the author) on investment of estate funds at the good old
"6% with absolute safety," nor to present any patent
methods of keeping all beneficiaries happy with investments
which never default and never decline.
We must also exclude other large questions under current discussion, such as the problem whether a fiduciary is ever
justified (in the absence of specific directions or authority)
in buying common stocks as a hedge against inflation, or
otherwise engaging in the pursuit of that rather elusive willof-the-wisp, the purchasing power of the dollar.
The real topic is much narrower; it is merely to see
whether any lessons can be drawn from recent decisions on
investment questions. There is no doubt that the last few
years have been very hard on fiduciaries. Without, for the
most part, any fault of theirs, they have seen much of the
value of their estates swept away, income drastically reduced.
Beneficiaries, very humanly, have been looking for someone
to blame. Probate judges and surrogates have been confronted
with case after case of widows and orphans reduced to actual
want, until even the judges' nerves have become jittery. As
a result more cases have been brought into court raising questions of fiduciary investment responsibility, than in any like
period for many years. What lessons may be learned from
the decisions growing out of these troubled times? What
are the things a fiduciary (using that general term to include
executors, administrators, guardians and conservators) should
not do?
By way of preface it goes without saying that orders of
court should be secured authorizing sales and other acts
83
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regarding estate investments. It is not suggested that fiduciaries should assume to act without court order, or take the
responsibility of selling estate investments without court approval. But the initiative must come from the fiduciaryobviously it cannot come from the court; and most of the
trouble arises not from action but from neglect. The fiduciary
holds investments and does nothing until after the damage is
done. If he has sought, and the court has refused, an order
of sale, he will doubtless be excused if loss occurs.
1. The fiduciary should not delay to wind up his
decedent's speculations.
A margin account, retained by the executor for four
months after testator's death, caused great loss to the estate
in the 1929 crash. Held: Under the circumstances the delay
was not unreasonable and the executor was not liable.
Lazaar's Est. 247 N. Y. S. 230.
This probably pushes reasonable time to the limit. It is
doubtful if an executor would ordinarily need four months
to close up a clearly speculative transaction. The case at least
sounds a warning.
2. The fiduciary should not act, with respect to his
estates' investments, on incompetent advice, nor delegate his
responsibilities to others.
The trustee for an infant consulted his attorney for investment advice, and turned estate money over to the attorney,
who bought bonds technically legal but inferior in quality,
which later defaulted. The trustee made no investigation.
Held: The advice of counsel will protect a trustee on a question of law, but will not relieve him from exercising discretion
which belongs to the trustee alone. His improvidence and
supine negligence justify his surcharge and removal. Reiks
Estate 18 D. C. (Pa.) 252, March 10, 1933.
An executor converted U. S. bonds into personal notes
secured by second mortgages on real estate with a faulty title.
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He presented his lawyer's advice as an excuse. The court said:
"While the advice of a lawyer may repel the imputation
of malice and bad faith, it can furnish no other justification.
If the advice be wrong and the client follow it, his conduct is
as wrong as the advice. Lawyers are not privileged to advise
foolishly, and their clients are not protected by their foolish
advice. The court will look at the act and not at its adviser
in judging of its merit or demerit." Hanscom v. Marston, 82
Me. 288, 19 Atl. 460.
In one of the numerous cases involving the Macky
will, under which the University of Colorado was the chief
beneficiary, it appeared that the executor was appointed in
1907 and did not file his final report until 1920-something
of a record in itself. Meanwhile he had litigated to the Supreme Court and back, every possible question. Year after
year during this whole period he kept sums from $10,000 to
$13,000 lying idle in open account in the bank, without a
cent of interest to the estate. As one excuse he pleaded advice
of his attorney (who, it appeared, had used insulting language
to the Regents and threatened to "get them yet"). Held:
Advice of his attorney is no excuse. The executor will be surcharged for interest on the idle funds. Regents v. Wilson,
73 Col. 1.
Even a judge's advice, it seems, must be official to be
effective.
Judge Gabbert in Thomas Est., 26 Colo. 110, had before him the case of a conservator who received $4,500 cash
and kept it on hand seven years, making no investment. On
application to surcharge him on his final account, his excuse
was that the County Judge had told him it was his duty
to keep the funds on hand ready to turn over promptly if
his ward should be declared sane. Judge Gabbert, after saying
that a conservator is not to collect the funds for the purpose
of turning them over to those entitled to them, like an ad-
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ministrator, but to invest them in a safe and permanent
manner to produce an income so that the ward's principal
may not be unnecessarily depleted, has this to say about the
alleged advice of the judge:
"The advice * * * does not appear to have been given in pursuance of an application to the court. * * * It is not the duty of a
(judge) to advise parties to any action regarding their rights and duties
except when the matter is presented to him in his official capacity.
Mere advice or suggestions on his part regarding matters in which he
does not assume to act judicially, are no protection to those who choose
to rely upon them."

3. If a guardian, he should not make investments
maturing beyond his ward's majority.
A guardian made investments in mortgages which were
legal, but which matured three years after the minor attained
majority. Held: Investment improper, and objection of
minor on attaining majority sustained. "The law has been
settled for generations that the property of an infant should
not be impounded beyond his majority." Blakes Est. (N.
Y.), L. J. March 4, 1933-Perry, Trusts, Section 608.
How rigidly this principle would be enforced may be
open to question. But obviously a guardian, knowing his
minor will attain majority in 1937, should not invest his
funds in bonds maturing in 1955. Whether it is good for
him or not, the minor is apparently entitled to have his estate
practically in cash when it is turned over to him, just as is a
general legatee under a will. Compare the prohibition on a
guardian leasing his ward's real estate beyond his majority.
Colo. C. L. Sec. 5270.
4. If an executor or administrator, he should not lose
sight of his primary duty: To liquidate his estate, pay debts,
taxes and legacies, and pay or distribute the residue.
An executor retained the testator's stocks and other nonlegal investments for a period of three years, while they
steadily declined in value, until there was nothing left of the
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estate. Held: The executor was guilty of negligence. He
should have liquidated the assets and had the estate ready for
distribution a year after the grant of letters. He was, therefore, surcharged the value of the retained stocks as of one
year from the date of letters. Estate of Junkersfield, Westchester Law Journal, April 30, 1935.
Executors, qualifying in 1931, found that the estate
consisted of real estate and twelve mortgage participation
certificates. During the whole of the first year of administration and for some time after, the mortgage certificates could
have been liquidated at 90% of their face; but they were
retained in the estate until final accounting, at which time they
were practically worthless. On objection to the executors'
account. Held: Executors surcharged in an amount of 90%
of the face of the mortgage participations. "This estate should
have been ready for distribution, except as to the real estate,
within a year after the issuance of letters. The certificates
should have been and could have been liquidated." Estate of
Price, N. Y. L. J., April 8, 1935.
5. He should not hold decedent's speculative and nonlegal securities longer than a reasonable time.
This assumes a jurisdiction like Colorado where a
statute definitely prescribes what investments fiduciaries may
make. It is also subject to several qualifications or exceptions
noted later.
In a recent New York case it appeared that a testator died
leaving a will with general legacies, residue to son and daughter, named executors. The estate consisted almost entirely of
speculative railway and industrial stocks, actively traded on
the exchange. At inventory value, the estate would have paid
its claims, general legacies and a fair residue. The executors,
hoping that the stocks would rise and their residue be increased, held the stocks until when they filed their account,
there was not enough in the estate to pay the general legacies.
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Held: They will be surcharged in an amount sufficient to pay
general legacies in full. The court, brushing aside the excuses
of the executors, which were that they were waiting (1) for
the date for presentation of claims; and (2) the result of
a tax controversy in a foreign jurisdiction-says "The testimony of the testator's son makes it clear that he and his sister,
as residuary legatees, were seeking to recoup the shrinkage in
value of the shares purchased at higher prices by their father,
and that they were seeking to do this solely for their own
benefit, and (after the value in the residuary disappeared),
solely at the expense of the legatees. Happy would be the
speculator who could use other people's money for his margin,
and who could take all the profits if the speculation won, and
who could lay any loss of capital on the helpless furnisher
of money for the speculation. The trust which these executors took upon themselves was to administer the property
which they received. Caution would have dictated an order
to sell these shares immediately upon qualification. Nothing
whatever has been shown except this wholly improper motive
to benefit the executors as residuary legatees, why there was
any delay in the sale. They were not justified in holding
speculative securities merely because they could not make disposition of the cash realized therefrom. Whether they thought
the testator had other debts or not, their duty to liquidate
speculative common stocks was an urgent, immediate duty.
When that duty had been performed they could have invested in legal securities, if they chose, or have held the money
at interest. The courts have recognized and will continue to
recognize the unusual burden cast upon fiduciaries by the
unprecedented shrinkage in values beginning in the fall of
1929. The current depression, however, has not given an
immunity bath to unfaithful fiduciaries. Fiduciaries who
have honestly struggled with a difficult situation without
seeking personal gain at the expense of the trust will be given
the benefit of that consideration which should be extended
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to good faith and honest effort, and fair performance of the
fiduciary duty. The fundamentals of fiduciary duty remain
unchanged. Speculation is still forbidden, prompt liquidation
of speculative assets is still the settled rule." Matter of Stumpf
N. Y. Sur., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 8, 1934.
An administrator received as assets 50 shares of stock of
a private corporation. He made no effort to sell; the business
was continued and at the end of the administration year the
stock became worthless. Held: The administrator surcharged.
Lichians Est., N. Y. Sur., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 8, 1932.
The first excepticn to the rule requiring prompt sale of
non-legals might be stated thus:
Unless holding non-legals be expressly or im(A)
pliedly authorized by the will.
On this Perry says: "If a testator gives any directions
in his will to continue his investments already made, trustees
must of course follow such directions; and if they follow them
in good faith, they will not be liable for any losses, unless
they are negligent in failing to change an investment, when
it ought to be changed to save it, for it cannot be supposed
that the direction of a testator to continue a certain investment
relieves the trustees from the ordinary duty of watching such
investment, and of calling it in when there is imminent danger
of its loss by a change of circumstances.

*

*

* It is true

that a testator during his life may deal with his property according to his pleasure, and investments made by him are some
evidence that he had confidence in that class of investments;
but, in the absence of directions in the will, it is more reasonable to suppose that a testator intended that his trustees
should act according to law. Consequently, in states where
the investments which trustees may make are pointed out by
law, the fact that the testator has invested his property in
certain stocks, or loaned it on personal security, will not
authorize trustees to continue such investments (even though
requested to do so by the beneficiary) beyond a reasonable
time for conversion and investment in regular securities (and
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what is reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances
of each particular case). Taking all the cases together, it
would appear to be a settled principle that trustees are not
justified, in the absence of express or implied directions in the
will, in continuing an investment permanently, made by the
testator, which they would not be justified themselves in making." Perry on Trusts, Sec. 465.
(B)
Unless requested and indemnified by all the beneficiaries.
A testatrix bequeathed her residuary estate to seven persons, one of whom was named executrix. A large part of the
estate consisted of speculative stocks. Shortly after the testatrix's death three of the seven authorized the executrix to
use her own judgment as to holding the stocks. She delayed
settlement for three years, holding the stocks, which fell in
value. Held: She will be charged with the value as of the
date when her account should have been settled, namely, one
year after the date of letters. A consent of three does not
bind the others. Matter of Drake, 152 N. Y. Misc. 395.
(C)
Unless sale is impossible or obviously unwise.
In the following New York case, the Surrogate dismissed
objection to an executor's account for failure to sell the testator's stock in a close corporation. The court says: "It may
be conceded that it would have been the duty of the executor
to sell the stock if a reasonable market could have been found;
but there is no proof that any such market ever existed. This
is not surprising, since the purchase of a minority interest in
a close corporation is a transaction which would appeal to
few persons." Matter of Middleditch, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 18,
1935.
If one were to attempt, from this incomplete survey of
recent depression cases, to summarize the duty of the fiduciary
with respect to his estate investments, one might say:
He should not fail to meet the highest standards of fiduciary care and diligence, nor to seek court instruction in any
case of doubt.

FAITH IN THE COURT*
By GEORGE R. FARNUM
Former Assistant Attorney General of the United States
"No one can read the history of the Court's career without marveling at its potent effect upon the political development of the Nation, and without concluding that the Nation
owes most of its strength to the determination of the Judges
to maintain the national supremacy."
Warren: The Supreme Court in United States History.

HE Constitution," declared Justice Holmes in one of
his most celebrated dissenting opinions, "is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." It has proved itself,
however, to be a transcendent experiment. Upon its foundation our social, political and economic life were organized and
have been developing toward certain ideals-albeit but dimly
visualized-for approximately a century and a half. The
guardian of its letter and spirit is the Supreme Court of the
United States. Chief Justice Hughes, when Governor of New
York, went so far as to declare: "We are under a constitution,
but the constitution is what the judges say it is." Those of
us who resist any effort to break down its essential integrity
rest our faith in its preservation upon our confidence in the
collective wisdom of the Court and the enlightened statesmanship of its individual members.
The acute exasperation in certain quarters with recent
decisions, notably that nullifying the N. R. A., is no novelty
in American history, though some people have for the moment seemingly forgotten it. In the early decades of its existence, while partisan feelings and political animosities ran
feverishly high, the Court was subjected to such abusive
attack that its usefulness, if not its very existence, was seriously endangered. At intervals since, certain decisions have
provoked recurrent storms of protest.
The Dred Scott case; doubtless an extremely regrettable
pronouncement, was the occasion for the bitterest denunciation. An editorial in the New York Tribune of the time was
l

*A recent address reproduced in the September 23. 1935, issue of Vital Speeches

of the Day.
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characteristic. "The long trumpeted decision * * * having
been held over from last year in order not too flagrantly to
alarm and exasperate the Free States on the eve! of an important presidential election * * * is entitled to just so much
moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those
congregated in any Washington barroom. It is a dictum prescribed by the stump to the bench." The New York Evening
Post, implying that the Court had become the mouthpiece of
a political party for the promulgation of falsehood, declared
that "the moment its decisions cease to be binding, and impeachment, not obedience, belongs to it." "The decision," it
added, "is a deliberate iniquity." Judged now, probably the
worst charge that can fairly be made against the motives of
the Court, as recently put by an eminent authority, is "the
Court yielded by an unfortunate second thought to Justice
Wayne's persuasion that it had in its grasp the opportunity
to settle the constitutional issues arising out of the slavery
question." In the days of Theodore Roosevelt, a project for
the popular recall of judicial decisions was seriously mooted.
As late as 1916 the recrudescence of hostility evoked from
Holmes the following commentary upon its implications:
"The attacks upon the Court are merely an expression of the
unrest that seems to wonder vaguely whether law and order
pay. When the ignorant are taught to doubt, they do not
know what they safely may believe. And it seems to me that
at this time we need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure."
When, however, the fierce political and sectional passions
of the moment ran their course, and the work of the Court
was seen in the sober retrospect, intelligent judgment has
never failed to pronounce the confident verdict that the tribunal performed its duty with unquestionable disinterestedness and, all things considered, wisely and well. Such decisions as the Dred Scott case have been singularly rare and have
been put down to those occasional mistakes from which no
human institution is entirely free.
Through more than a century and a half of extraordinary transformations in our national life, the Court has succeeded in preserving the fundamental character of our constitutional institutions. Looking back dispassionately over the
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difficult path of adjudication, the accomplishment seems little
short of miraculous. It involved the task of applying a general text to conditions never dreamed of by its authors. It
demanded a practical reconciliation, under continually changing social and political conditions, between the Hamiltonian
conception of nationalism (expounded by Chief Justice Marshall) and the Jeffersonian doctrine of state rights (aptly
referred to as the dual-federalism of Madison). It required
the elaboration of a working compromise between traditional
rights of property (or vested interests, as they are termed in
constitutional law) and a recognition of the significance of
human values. It exacted from the Court a reasonable harmonizing of the economic philosophy of laissez faireattended by the phenomenal growth of capitalistic individualism-and the necessity of making a fair concession to our
evolving ideas of a social democratic state. They were largely
pioneer questions of great complexity. In dealing with these
importunate antinomies the Court has seemingly accomplished for the practical ends involved, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
would put it in his flair for posing paradoxes, "The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites."
That there should be some vacillation at times was natural; that views once expressed had in some instances to be
reconsidered in the light of further reflection and the changing
times was unavoidable. It is probably a fact that of no
branch of our jurisprudence can it be more fitly said, than of
constitutional law-in the words of Holmes-that "We do
not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.
No concrete proposition is self-evident, no matter how ready
we may be to accept it."
Furthermore, the character of the medium with which
the Court was dealing must never be lost sight of. As Marshall long ago pointed out, it was a constitution that was
being expounded, and Holmes subsequently added: "But
a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relations of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accidents
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of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States." Dealing with such basic
problems in political philosophy, social science and economic
theory, it was inevitable that the individual members of the
Court should not infrequently differ in their views. Indeed,
this very difference was a healthy indication of vital and independent thinking and proof that the Court was not committed to any one-sided philosophy but was representative of
various ideas that were fairly entitled to their day in court.
In passing judgment, it is also well to bear in mind the
national crises through which the Court has guided us-the
precarious formative period when our American experiment
might have collapsed; the critical period of the Civil War
with its disturbing aftermath of reconstruction; the phenomenal growth of our industrial civilization with its proliferating
problems, and the unprecedented disruption of the World
War followed by bewildering economic breakdown.
In time, those who today hotly impugn the N. R. A.
case-as those who denounced other decisions in the pastwill arrive at a better understanding of its real significance.
After all, it announced no new principle. It simply applied
old fundamental ideas to a radical departure in legislation. It
no more than reminded us again-albeit forcefully and dramatically-that ours is a constitutional democracy. Reading
the two opinions which constituted the unanimous decision
dispassionately, it is difficult to see how the draftsmen of the
act could have believed that it could be squared with American
political ideals and familiar legal theory. Possibly some feelings of grave misgivings explain at least in part the government's reluctance to invite a decisive test and its tardy acceptance of the gage of constitutional battle.
The moral of these few pages is that those of us who are
fairly content with our traditional and established form of
constitutional government-and, while discerning its defects,
can see on the whole no acceptable substitute for it-should
remain steadfast in our confidence in the great Court upon
which in the last analysis its preservation depends. In our
history we find ample support for our faith.

EXCESSIVE PUBLICITY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

AT

From American Bar Association

ITS mid-winter meeting in Chicago on January 13-17,

the Executive Committee of the American Bar Association received the report and specific recommendations
of the special committee created by the association, in its section of Criminal Law, to consider and report as to the ways
and means of curbing excessive publicity in connection with
criminal trials. The special committee was composed of ExJudge Oscar Hallam of Minneapolis, Minnesota; John Kirkland Clark of New York City; Dean Albert J. Harno of the
Law School of the University of Illinois; and Charles P.
Taft, II, of Cincinnati, Ohio.
Although this report originated in various phases of the
press and radio activity in connection with the Hauptmann
trial, the Executive Committee of the American Bar Association considered the matter in its broader aspects, as to the prevention of publicity interfering with fair trial and orderly
determination in connection with other judicial and quasijudicial proceedings, including civil as well as criminal trials.
The incidents of the Hauptmann trial were not regarded as
solitary. The Executive Committee voted that association
create a special committee of its members, to act in cooperation
with committees from press and radio organizations, to see if
sound and practicable standards can be formulated as to such
publicity, for enforcement through rules of Court and the
action of press and radio associations, as well as by the lawyers. The recommendations as to the conduct of criminal
trials will be the starting-point for the work of the joint committee.
In making public the recommendations of the special
committee which reviewed the publicity incident to the
Hauptmann trial, President Ransom reiterated that "The
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American Bar Association and its special committee have not
in any way concerned themselves with the guilt or innocence
of Bruno Hauptmann, but have considered only the feasibility
of corrective measures for the future. The committee passed
no judgment on the guilt or innocence of Hauptmann, whose
guilt has been found by the Courts to be established by the
evidence."
The report of the special committee has not been made
public at this time. The recommendations of the special committee are:
"In the foregoing report we have tried to make a fair presentation
of salient facts. We have been moved less by spirit of censure than by
hope of remedial action. The excesses we have described differ from
practices in many other cases mainly in degree.
"The trial of a criminal case is a business that has for its sole
purpose the administration of justice, and it should be carried on without distracting influences.
"Passing from the general to the specific we recommend:
"That attendance in the courtroom during the progress of a crim.
inal trial be limited to the seating capacity of the room.
"That the process of subpoena or any other process of the court
should never be used to secure preferential admission of any person or
spectator; that such abuse of process be punished as contempt.
"That approaches to the courtroom be kept clear, to the end that
free access to the courtroom be maintained.
"That no use of cameras or photographic appliances be permitted
in the courtroom, either during the session of the court or otherwise.
"That no sound registering devices for publicity use be permitted
to operate in the courtroom at any time.
"That the surreptitious procurement of pictures or sound records
be considered contempt of court and be punished as such.
"That the courtroom. and the court house be kept free from news
distributing devices and equipment.
"That newspaper accounts of criminal proceedings be limited to
accounts of occurrences in court without argument of the case to the
public.
"That no popular referendum be taken during the pendency of
the litigation as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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"That broadcasting of arguments, giving out of argumentive press
bulletins, and every other form of argument or discussion addressed to
the public by lawyers in the case during the progress of the litigation
be definitely forbidden.
"That bulletins by the defendant issued to the public during the
progress of the trial be definitely forbidden.
"That public criticism of the court or jury by lawyers in the case
during the progress of the litigation be not tolerated.
"That featuring in vaudeville of jurors or other court officers,
either during or after the trial, be forbidden.
"That the giving of paid interviews or the writing of paid articles
by jurors, either during or after the trial, be forbidden.
"That the atmosphere of the courtroom and adjacent premises be
maintained as one of dignity and calm."

At the annual luncheon in connection with the midwinter meeting of the Ohio State Bar Association on January
17, Frank J. Hogan, member of the Executive Committee of
the American Bar Association, spoke on "Trials and Publicity." On January 18, the Toledo News-Bee, member of
the Scripps-Howard Press, said editorially:
"If the Bar Association of America can state a code of ethics covering the publicity of trials which is sensible and which does not violate
decent practices of free publication, and if they can discipline the members of their own profession to abide by that code, they will be met
more than half way at any time by the great majority of newspapers,
and by the heads of the two great press services of the land."

James D. Fisher, formerly manager of the Estates Division of the
Colorado National Bank, recently took up his residence at 656 South
Ridgely Drive, Los Angeles, California, and has located temporarily
with Benjamin T. Weinstein, also formerly of Denver, at 927 Security
Building. It is Mr. Fisher's desire to apply for admission to the California bar.
LAW OFFICE LOCATION
Mrs. Pearl Klockenteger, Flagler, Colo., has asked DICTA to state
that she has for sale the law office, good library and a good practice left
by her late husband, at Flagler. She will furnish full information
concerning the same to any interested party.

A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE LEGALIZED BY THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW1
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar

T IS popularly presumed that in most bankruptcy proceedings the Act was or is invoked by one who had
engaged in an extensive business and became unduly vexed
or oppressed by rapacious creditors. Lawyers know, however, that petitions in voluntary bankruptcy have been filed
by persons who never had a business which at any time required indebtedness not easily paid. In such instances the
creditors were more in need of the law's solicitude than were
the petitioners.
When one has been regularly receiving sufficient income
to supply necessaries for himself and family and yet, with an
undiminished earning capacity, plans to obtain a "discharge"
in bankruptcy, it is not difficult to suspect that he willfully
intends to evade payment to those who furnished such goods
and services as contributed to his comfort. In any event, it is
likely that his dentist, grocer, landlady, automobile mechanic
and others can ill afford to remain unpaid and have their just
claims forever barred by the "discharge."
An individual voluntary bankrupt is frequently one
who has always been, still is, and will continue to be sumptuously fed, well dressed, comfortably housed, and surrounded
by friends able and willing to aid him in making business
contacts and profits. Occasionally it may be said of one that
his legalized evasion of debts and prior activities may have
forced, or may drive, others into pauperism, but he himself is
never in the economic category of those whom he derisively
calls "bums."
For the protection of some of the trusting victims of the
seemingly prosperous individual who seeks, through bankruptcy, to repudiate his obligations to those who furnished
him with goods or services, the statute purports to prevent
one form of thievery. It is provided that a discharge shall not
release a bankrupt from "liabilities for obtaining property by
'Revision of article first published in American Bankruptcy Review (N. Y., Nov.,
1935).
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false pretenses or false representations."
Since the guilty
swindler always denies, with pretended indignation, having
made any false pretenses, and since the burden of proof is on
the injured creditor, the practical operation of the protective
clause in question is obviously impeded. If it was easy for
the bankrupt to cheat an unsuspecting friend, it is not too difficult for the culprit to testify falsely. Moreover, if the creditor had been entrapped by artful concealments, it may be impossible for him to prove to the admitted satisfaction of a
court that the non-disclosure of relevant circumstances was
intentional or fraudulent.
Furthermore, many creditors are precluded from showing even the most palpable fraud, because the clause in question literally and actually aids only those who have been
deprived of "property" as the direct result of the bankrupt's
falsehoods. Accordingly, if one obtains by fraudulent representations the indorsement of his promissory note, the claim
of the indorser or surety is barred by the maker's "discharge"
in bankruptcy.2 The indorsement is not "property," within
the meaning of the statute, though it does ultimately result in
the loss of money.
When a schemer first conceives the idea of evading his
financial obligations in the way permitted by the Act, the plan
is, like a plot for an intended perfect crime, kept a secret long
enough for the hatching and consummation of selfish and dishonest schemes. The unscrupulous individual contemplating
bankruptcy may pretend to believe that for him there is legitimate prosperity just around the corner, and with that pretense
proceed to utilize his credit to a full and unconscionable limit.
He shows that he is not without all luxuries enjoyed by solvent persons, even flaunting a latest model automobile in the
hope that it may excite the envy of his frugal neighbors.
With secret knowledge of his insolvency and impending
bankruptcy, the miscreant in question applies for loans from
industrial banks. These wary institutions take no chances,
and require sureties who will give satisfactory answers to an
elaborate financial questionnaire. The applicant, by the aid
of the past and current manifestations of friendship, influences
'Barnes v. Frost (Miss.). 133 So. 119.
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a number of his acquaintances to become sureties on his promissory notes. The money is then received by, and the consequential benefits therefrom inure to, this wily borrower and
no one else. When it is no longer possible to continue such
fiscal operations, he shamelessly files a petition in voluntary
bankruptcy. His air of respectability is not diminished.
The sureties have been, or eventually will be, compelled
to pay the notes of their immune principal. They have no
remedy against a bankrupt without assets. A "discharge"
relieves the latter of the obligations he owes to his sureties,
even if he had obtained their suretyship by false or fraudulent
representations. Obviously, therefore, a flagrant injustice may
be perpetrated within, and permitted by, the Bnakruptcy Act.
It will be possible to find at some first meeting of creditors before the referee that the bankrupt himself is serene and
happy, anticipating enjoyment from his future income, while
keen distress is manifested by the wives of some hapless sureties. One may imagine, if not cite, cases where such women
were aggrieved because they realized that through no fault of
their own the future earnings of their respective husbands
would, in part, be diverted to the banking payees of the bankrupt's notes. In such situations, while the bankrupt was complacently preparing to make rosy his own future, he was
darkening that of his former accommodating, and lately betrayed, associates. Not the once spendthrift and high living
bankrupt, but these honest, industrious and frugal victims
were in danger of becoming embarrassed besiegers of a charitable relief agency. Those who stand in a bread line are not
those to whom a bankruptcy court has granted a "discharge."
If any amendment of the law is contemplated or imminent, the bankrupt's personal sureties and guarantors are
entitled to the first consideration. Under the present law, at
the same time that a bankrupt is relieved by a discharge of a
"burden of debt" his surety, who never had anything to gain
from his principal's prior transactions, is saddled with a part
of this burden and without receiving, as the bankrupt received, any part of the consideration which moved from the
third party. If the suretyship was obtained by fraud, the
situation becomes still more distressing to the surety. The
average person would prefer to have his money stolen directly
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by an execrated thief and thereafter remember only the monetary loss, than to have his funds conventionally filched by a
supposedly upright citizen and then be compelled not only to
bear the tangible loss but also to contemplate the surprising
perfidy of the trusted acquaintance.
One possible and just way of amending the law would
be to enact a provision which would relieve the surety of his
duty to the obligee or payee at the same time that the bankrupt is discharged. Then the burden would fall on the creditor who in some way profited or expected to profit from his
transaction with the bankrupt. This sort of amendment
would conform to. the salutary principle that where one of
two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, he
who furnishes the means to commit it must bear the loss.
Inasmuch as the plan above suggested would in some
cases be unjust to an obligee or payee, a better amendment
would be one which would make a discharge inapplicable to
any obligation which a bankrupt has incurred with respect to
his sureties or guarantors. When one assumes the status of a
surety, he generally does so because of pressure brought to
bear upon him by the prospective principal. Furthermore,
the latter represents, expressly or impliedly, that he will fulfil
his obligation to the third party and thus save harmless all
concerned. The personal surety usually believes that he is, in
effect, but a well-advised character witness for his principal.
The latter often makes representations and concealments
which induce that belief. When a prospective principal so
commercializes the friendship of an associate as to induce the
latter to assume the burden and responsibility of a surety, he,
the principal, ought to be willing to demonstrate the genuineness of his own professed friendship and the truthfulness of
his representations by striving even for a lifetime, if necessary,
to reimburse his surety whenever the latter is compelled to pay
the debt. An honest principal will do this in spite of a discharge permitting the contrary. A dishonest or an indifferent
one ought to be compelled to remain liable to his surety or
guarantor. This would not be inconsistent with any other
reform, heretofore suggested by others, intended to discourage
dishonesty and to aid creditors.

FRAUD -

ELEMENTS -

PLEADING-

JUSTICE

COURT

PRACTICE-

Strainar vs. Vendetti, et al.-No. 13865-Decided January 13,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Vendetti had judgment in Justice Court against Strainar for deficiency after foreclosure of a mortgage upon an automobile. Strainar
appealed to County Court and recovered judgment for full balance and
on a directed verdict following sustaining of a demurrer to a written
statement of defense based upon fraud, but which on its face failed to
set forth all the necessary elements of fraud.
HELD: 1. A defense in the court below on the theory of fraud
cannot be abandoned in the higher court for another theory. Such
abandonment of the theory constitutes an abandonment of the cause.
2. While pleadings are not required in Justice Court, yet on
appeal where a statement is made by defendant that the defense is fraud,
the trial court had power to require such defense be stated orally or in
writing so that it could determine whether such defense was available
and where such statement omitted some of the necessary elements, a
demurrer was properly sustained.-Judgmentaffirmed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER-SUBSTITUTED LEASECONFLICTING EVIDENCE-The Alamosa Realty Investment and

Theatre Company vs. The Gordon Stores Company, Inc.-No.
13593-Decided January 13, 1936---Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
Plaintiff below recovered judgment against defendnat for rent to
end of term of a written lease extended to April 30, 1933. It sought
also to recover additional rent for another year on theory that defendant
had placed a subtenant in possession and that defendant was holding
over. Defense was that subsequent parties in possession were not subtenants of defendant, but were tenants of plaintiff under a new agreement. Both theories were submitted to the jury.
HELD: Where the theory of both plaintiff and defendant were
submitted to jury by appropriate instructions, a verdict rendered upon
conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.--Judgmentaffirmed.
JUVENILE DEPENDENCY-LIABILITY OF FATHER FOR CARE OF UNBORN CHILD AND MOTHER-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Metzger

vs. The People-No. 13838-Decided January 6, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Defendant below was convicted in the Juvenile Court of being the
father of an unborn child and was ordered to pay thirty per cent of his
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earnings for the care of the expectant mother and child. He attacks the
constitutionality of the law.
1. The original Juvenile Act passed in 1907 in defining what a
dependent child was did not refer to an unborn child. In 1923 the
statute was amended to include unborn child. The amendment was
germane to the original title, hence the amendment was constitutional.
2. The policy of legislation is for determining by the General
Assembly and not by the courts. When the respondent complained of
the amendment it had been on the statute books for twelve years. He
could not have been surprised or prejudiced under these circumstances.Judgment affirmed.
INHERITANCE TAX-TRANSFERS MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO

People vs. Estate of
William S. Hadfield-No. 13620-Decided December 30, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Demurrer to petition filed by the State of Colorado to appraise
after discovered assets and to assess an additional inheritance tax thereon
was sustained in the County Court.
1. The petition stated a cause of action.
2. A petition, stating among other things that the transfer of
real estate was made by the deceased to his wife more than one year
prior to his death without valuable or adequate consideration, states a
cause of action.
3. The proviso in the statute with reference to transfers made
within one year prior to death simply creates a legal presumption which
dispenses with the production of further evidence when the transfer is
shown to have occurred not more than one year before death. It leaves
earlier transfers to be proved in the usual way.
4. Nor will the state be deprived of the right to prove, if it can,
that in this particular case the grantor died within a year after the transfer was completed by delivery of the deed.-Judgment reversed.
DEATH-PLEADINGS-DEMURRER-The

DIVORCE-

INTERLOCUTORY

DECREE-

SETTING

ASIDE

AFTER

Administrator vs.
Propst-No. 13857-DecidedJanuary 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Husband and wife in contemplation of divorce proceedings entered
into written contract settling their respective property rights and relinquishing further claim to each other's property. An interlocutory decree of divorce was entered in favor of the wife. Before the six months
ensued she died and her husband filed an unverified motion to set aside
the interlocutory decree, which was granted.
1. The demurrer of the husband to the amended answer of the
administrator, which, among other things, plead the complete property
settlement between the parties, should not have been sustained.
DEATH-PROPERTY

SETTLEMENT-Morris,
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2. Where the settlement contract between the parties provided,
among other things, "that in case at any time in the future a decree of
divorce shall be granted to either of the parties hereto, that a copy of this
agreement may be filed with the court in which such divorce decree is
entered, and shall be considered as a full and complete adjudication of
the property rights of the parties hereto." It would be hard to make
these words mean anything else than that both spouses then and there

relinquished further claim to each other's property.
3. The trial court took the view that in order to effectuate the
contract it was necessary to file the latter with the divorce court. The
contract was merely directory and does not create a forfeit in the event
of its not being so filed and the trial court erred in describing a mandatory character to this provision.
4. We cannot approve of the attempt here made after the death
of the wife to set aside an interlocutory decree recovered by her in a
divorce suit against a surviving husband on his mere unsupported motion, the only ground of which is his own desire to have it set aside.
This is no legal ground.---Judgment reversed.
WILLS---SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE

TO MAKE A WILL-Ballou

vs.

First National Bank of Colorado Springs-No. 13688-Decided
December 23, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Suit for specific performance of alleged oral contract to make will
whereby plaintiff was to receive certain property. Deceased died leaving
a will which was admitted to probate without objection by plaintiff,
who filed a claim in County Court for services rendered; the claim was
denied, and no appeal was taken. Thereafter this suit brought in District Court.
HELD: Plaintiff has no right to litigate in the District Court
matters that were settled in County Court. The evidence was the same
in both courts and was insufficient to establish the claim for specific
performance.---Judgmentaffirmed.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-FILING AMENDED COMPLAINT-Young-

berg vs. Canal Co. etc.-No. 13769-Decided December 23, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard,on Supersedeas.
Plaintiff petitioned for receiver in 1910, appointment made and
assets of Canal Company sold to one Johnson in 1915. Johnson transferred to Butte Valley Company and assets taken under execution
against Butte Company in 1924 and sold to one Dick. In 1933 and
1934 plaintiff filed amended petition for receiver, without leave of court,
praying for new receiver.
HELD: Trial court was right in striking amended petition from
files, there having been no leave granted to file same. The filing of an
amended petition for complaint rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.-Judgment affirmed.
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PHOTOGRAPHS-PERSONAL

PRIVACY-USE

OF

FOR ADVERTISING

PURPOSES WITHOUT CONSENT-McCreery vs. Miller's Grocerteria Company, et al.-No. 13636-Decided February 3, 1936Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
McCreery brought this action against the defendants to recover
money judgment for damages for humiliation and mental suffering in
using her photograph for advertising purposes without her consent or
approval. Demurrers to the complaint for insufficient facts were sustained and plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint. Dismissal entered.
1. The complaint stated a cause of action.
2.
The photographer was under an implied contract not to make
a commercial use of plaintiff's photograph which he had taken and his
co-defendants are jointly liable with him in using the photograph for
advertising purposes without the consent or approval of the plaintiff,
where the nature of the photographer's calling was such as to put them
on their inquiry as to the right to use the photograph.
3.
When the plaintiff employed the defendant, Ware, as a photographer to take her picture an implied contract arose that he would not
make a commercial use of the picture. The defendants violated that
implied contract by making commercial use thereof without her consent.
Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.

RAPE---SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION-EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS
-Brock vs. The People-No. 13882-Decided February 3, 1936
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Brock was convicted in the court below of statutory rape.
1. The supporting affidavit to the information for rape made by
the mother of the prosecuting witness need not be made on personal
knowledge of the commission of the act.
2. There was sufficient evidence that the prosecutrix was unmarried.
3.
There was ample corroboration of the act which is furnished
by time, place and circumstances and status of the defendant.
4. It was proper to ask the defendant on cross examination if he
was married.
5.
Where defendant was cross examined, over objection, as to
the conduct of a male companion at the time and place of the alleged
rape, while this was not part of the res jestae it was admissible as
bearing upon the frame of mind and intent of defendant and the probable relations of the parties.
6. Evidence that the defendant sought the prosecuting witness
at her home and interviewed her after the alleged defense was admissible.
7.
Instructions examined and approved.--Judgment affirmed.
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LIQUORS-LICENSE-DISCRETION OF CITY COUNCIL-HOME RULE

CITY-Houston vs. Gilman-No. 13777-Decided February 3,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
The plaintiff, Gilman, who had theretofore requested the mayor
and city council of Boulder to grant and issue to him a liquor license
which was refused, brought mandamus to compel issuance. The alternative writ was issued. The demurrer of defendants being overruled.
They elected to stand on the demurrer and decree was entered that the
license be issued.
1. Article 22 of the Constitution was amended November 8,
1932, and this amendment was in force at the time Gilman applied for
his license.
2. Article 22, as amended, repealed all former liquor laws and
that from and after July 1, 1933, the legislature by statutory regulations could regulate the manufacture and sale of liquor throughout
the state and pursuant to this amendment the general liquor law being
Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1935, were enacted.
3. The City of Boulder, a so-called "home rule city," is subject
to the provisions of Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1935.
4. Therefore, it is within the reasonable discretion of its city
council to grant or refuse applications for the sale of liquor therein.
5.
There is no showing in the record that the city council has
abused its discretion or exceeded its authority in such refusal. It seems
to have acted in the premises according to law and its own conception of
right and duty in refusing permission to Gilman of the right to sell
liquors in Boulder-Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
Bouck think that the case has become moot and therefore the writ of
error should be dismissed.
LIQUORS-LICENSE-DISCRETION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERSMANDAMUS-Van De Vegt vs. Board of County Commissioners
of Larimer County-No. 13818-Decided February 3, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Van De Vegt sought to procure from the County Court of Larimer
County a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of County Commissioners to issue a liquor license permitting him to sell liquor in his
drug store 700 feet south of the southern city limits of Fort Collins on
the Fort Collins-Loveland highway. The County Court denied the
writ.
1. The liquor act being chapter 142 of the Session Laws of
1935, provides among other things that the board of county commissioners shall have authority to refuse to issue a license for good cause.
2.
The right to refuse for good cause of necessity vests in it in the
first instance the right to determine what is good cause for refusal.
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3. Where it so refuses, the action is subject to review to ascertain
whether its action was capricious or arbitrary.
4. Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administrative board can arise in only three ways:
a. By neglecting or refusing to use reasonable diligence and care
to procure such evidence as it is by law authorized to consider in exercising the discretion vested in it.
b. By failing to give candid and honest consideration of the
evidence before it.
c. By exercising its discretion in such manner as to indicate that
its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach con'
trary conclusions.
5. Evidence examined and held that the action of the board
was not a capricious or arbitrary exercise of its discretion in refusing to
grant the license.
6. A case is not moot where interests of a public character are
asserted under conditions that it may be immediately repeated, merely
because the time for a particular order has expired.-Judgment affirmed.
Ar. Justice Holland dissents. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
Bouck dissent on the grounds that the case has become moot and for
that reason the writ of error should be dismissed.
ARBITRATION-IMPEACHMENT

OF

AWARD---GROUNDS

OF-Noff-

singer vs. Thompson-No. 13605- Decided February 3, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
In an action by one party against another for an accounting, the
issue was whether defendant was indebted to plaintiff and, if so, in
what sum. The matter was submitted to arbitration under Chapter 27,
Code of Civil Procedure. By determination of two of arbitrators, plaintiff was denied recovery and he sought to impeach the award on the
grounds that one of the arbitrators joining in the award proposed from
the beginning to decide in favor of the defendant and so expressed
himself irrespective of the evidence. Impeachment denied below:
I. An arbitrator is an agent of both parties alike and is bound to
exercise a high degree of impartiality, without the slighest degree of
friendship or favor toward either party.
2. If arbitrators conduct themselves with bias or partiality, this
amounts in law to misconduct which will warrant the setting aside of
the award.
3. Section 320 of the code provides that an adjudication by
arbitrators may be "set aside for fraud or other sufficient cause."
4. The arbitrator having misconceived his duty, his participation brought about injustice and required abrogation of the award.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell dissents.
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INSURANCE - ACCIDENTDOUBLE INDEMNITY, SUICIDE--Capitol
Life Co. vs. Di Iullo--No. 13778-DecidedDecember 23, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Insurance policy issued and as a part thereof contained a double
indemnity provision in case of accidental death, excluding suicide, while
sane or insane. Premium of $7.50 was paid annually. Trial court
directed verdict in accordance with Section 2532, C. L. 1921.
HELD:
There are two elements necessary to a recovery: One,
death of the insured; two, an accident. Suicide while sane is not an
accident. Section 2532 does not apply when a policy provides for the
payment of money upon accidental death and the insured commits suicide while sane.--Judgment reversed with instruction to dismiss.
AUTOMOBILES-DRIVER AND PEDESTRIAN-INSTRUCTIONS-DAMAGES-Sherman vs. Ross-No. 13678-Decided December 23,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action by a pedestrian against motorist. Plaintiff was struck and
injured while crossing an intersection in Denver. The court instructed
the jury that the amount of care by law exacted of the motorist is far
greater than that exacted of the pedestrian, that the pedestrian may
assume care on the part of the motorist, that an automobile is a machine
capable of doing great damage, and that the jury in computing the
damage might consider future medical expenses. The court refused to
instruct that the motorist might assume care on the part of the pedestrian and that the motorist would not be liable if the accident be found
to be unavoidable. Verdict and judgment below were for plaintiff.
1. The negligence instruction as given imposed too high a duty
upon the motorist and should have been complemented by the instructions tendered on the duty of the pedestrian and the result if the accident were found unavoidable.
2.
In the absence of evidence, the instruction on damages should
not have permitted the consideration of future medical expenses.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Chief
Justice Butler not participating.
PAYMENT-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PAROL EVIDENCE RULE-JUSTICE COURTS-McCaffrey vs. Mitchell-No. 13 5 3 6-Decided
December 23, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Youig.
Action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note secured
by deed of trust. Three defenses were raised: First, that the payee of
the note orally agreed to look only to the real property for payment;
second, that the payee accepted an assignment of the maker's claim
against another as payment; third, that a prior suit in the Justice Court
for collection of the note was pending. Judgment below was for defendant on the verdict of the jury.
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1. There was no evidence that the payee of the note either expressly or impliedly accepted the assignment. An attorney by virtue of
his employment is without authority to release or discharge a claim
belonging to his client. It was therefore error to submit this issue to
the jury.
2. It is not permissible to show a parol agreement of the payee
not to enforce payment against the maker of commercial paper, nor to
show an agreement to require payment only out of a particular fund.
3. There was no prior suit pending. Neither party appeared in
the Justice-Court and, under Section 6056, Compiled Laws, 1921, the
case was automatically dismissed.-Reversed with instructions to enter

judgment for plaintiff.

Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
INSURANCE--SUICIDE AS A DEFENSE-OccidentalLife Insurance Co.

vs. United States National Bank-No. 13459-Decided December
23, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Action on life insurance policy providing for double indemnity if
insured should die as the result of sustaining bodily injuries (except in
case of suicide while sane or insane) effected by the happening of a
purely accidental event. Insured met death under circumstances indicating suicide. There was no evidence of insanity. The trial court directed a verdict against the insurance company.
1. If insured committed suicide while sane, Section 2532, Compiled Laws, 1921, does not apply and the insurance company is not
liable.
2. There is a presumption against suicide, but that presumption
may b overcome by direct or circumstantial evidence.
3. It was error to reject evidence tending to show a motive for
suicide.
4. Death certificate indicating that insured's death was suicidal

was admissible.--Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.
STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-EVIDENCE--City

and County of Den-

ver vs. Commissioners of Logan County, et at.-No. 13720Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The city of Denver brought this action under Section 8914, C. L.
1921, which in substance provides for the payment of a sum of money
by a county which intentionally shall bring and leave any pauper or
paupers in any other county wherein such pauper is not lawfully settled,
knowing them to be paupers. Judgment below was for the defendant
on the merits of the case.
1. The record reviewed and the evidence found to be insufficient
to justify a finding for the plaintiff as provided for in the statutes.
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2. The statute on which this action is based is penal in character
and, therefore, is to be strictly construed.
3. The findings of the lower court were based upon evidence
amply sufficient to sustain such findings and, under the well settled rule,
the findings will not be disturbed.--Judgmentis right and will be af-

firmed.
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